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Abstract: With inflation and policy interest rates at historically low levels, policymakers 
show great concern about "downside tail risks" due to a zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates. Low probability or tail events, such as sustained deflation or recession, 
are disruptive for the economy and can be difficult to resolve. This paper shows that 
price-level targeting mitigates downside tail risks respect to inflation targeting when 
policy is conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero lower bound. 
Thus, price-level targeting is a more effective policy framework than inflation targeting 
for the management of downside tail risks in a low-inflation economy. At the same 
time, the average performance of the economy is not very different if policy implements 
price-level targeting instead of inflation targeting through a simple interest-rate rule. 
Price-level targeting may imply less variability of inflation than inflation targeting 
because policymakers can shape private-sector expectations about future inflation more 
effectively by targeting directly the price level path rather than inflation. 
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 1 Introduction
The public, policymakers, and economists agree that a return to the high rates of in￿ ation experienced
in the 1970s and 1980s must be avoided because high in￿ ation is detrimental to the economic well-being
of the public.1 As a result, central banks have adopted policies to keep in￿ ation low in recent decades.
The Federal Reserve￿ s preferred measure of in￿ ation is the personal consumption expenditure (PCE)
price index. This paper shows that in a small New-Keynesian sticky-price model, private-sector con-
sumption is as much as 0.5 percentage point higher if PCE-price in￿ ation in the long run is 1.5 percent
per year rather than 3.5 percent per year.2 Thus, the Federal Reserve must keep in￿ ation low because
reverting back to moderate or high rates of in￿ ation would hamper the economic well-being of the public
over the long run.
When in￿ ation is low and expected to remain low, then nominal interest rates tend to be low. But
nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero under normal circumstances.3 Since central banks coun-
teract slowing economic activity by lowering short-term interest rates, the extent to which policymakers
can respond to an economic slowdown is limited in a low-in￿ ation economy. Once short-term nominal
interest rates fall to zero, conventional monetary policy tools no longer work to stimulate economic
activity. As a consequence, downside risks to the economy, such as de￿ ation or recession, are greater
when in￿ ation is low.
With in￿ ation and policy interest rates at historically low levels, policymakers show concern about
downside risks due to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Policymakers are particularly
concerned about downside tail risks, such as sustained de￿ ation or recession, which are disruptive for
the economy and can be di¢ cult to resolve. Moreover, models are typically better approximations of
how the economy functions on average rather than in extreme circumstances. As a result, policymakers
have an incentive to embrace ￿ risk management￿and make economic decisions that are robust to the
occurrence of low probability catastrophes or tail risks.
The economics literature provides policymakers intuition about the e⁄ectiveness of some monetary
1See Fischer (1996) for a discussion of the costs of in￿ ation.
2Available measures of in￿ ation tend to be biased upward. As former Federal Reserve Governor Gramlich (2003)
discusses, recent estimates place the measurement bias in the PCE price index at about 0.5 percentage point per year.
Such bias has to be added to the model-based in￿ ation rate to obtain an actual, measured in￿ ation rate.
3In theory, achieving negative nominal interest rates is feasible by levying a tax on money holdings or giving up free
convertibility of ￿nancial assets into cash￿ Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Goodfriend (2000) discuss this idea.
1Policy Framework￿ Loss% s.d.(i)% Fr(i = 0)% s.d.(￿)% Skew.(￿) Kurt.(￿)
Optimal Policy ￿0:13 1:6 0:4 0:91 0:0 3:0
Optimal Simple IT Rule (￿￿ = 1:0) ￿0:17 1:2 0:0 0:80 0:0 3:0




￿0:18 1:0 0:0 0:77 0:0 3:0
Aggressive Simple IT Rule (￿￿ = 2:5) ￿0:18 1:9 1:0 0:65 ￿0:3 3:8




￿0:19 1:4 0:0 0:65 0:0 3:0
￿PCE-price in￿ ation in the long run is 1.5 percent per year under each policy framework. The simple policy
rules change the nominal interest rate subject to a zero lower bound in response to in￿ ation deviations from
the in￿ ation target, or price-level deviations from the target path, but not output deviations.
Table 1: Low In￿ ation and the Zero Lower Bound in the small New-Keynesian Model
policy frameworks for the management of downside risks due to a zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates, such as de￿ ation or recession. However, the economics literature does not provide intuition about
the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy frameworks for the management of downside tail risks, such as
sustained de￿ ation or recession.
For instance, Coenen and Wieland (2004), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Gaspar, Smets and
Vestin (2007), McCallum (2000), Nakov (2008), Svensson (2003), Wolman (2005), and others show
how price-level targeting can mitigate the zero-lower-bound constraint on the policy interest rate and
help manage downside risks. The private sector anticipates that the central bank will undo any price
changes under price-level targeting, and thus a central bank is more e⁄ective at shaping private-sector
expectations about future in￿ ation by targeting directly the price level path rather than in￿ ation. Such
studies, however, do not show how price-level targeting can help manage downside tail risks.
This paper shows the e⁄ectiveness of price-level targeting, as an alternative to in￿ ation targeting,
for the management of downside tail risks in a small New-Keynesian sticky-price model when policy is
conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
The performance of the economy under simple policy rules, which implement price-level targeting or
in￿ ation targeting, is compared to the welfare-maximizing performance that would be achieved under
time-zero optimal policy subject to a zero lower bound.
Table 1 summarizes the main ￿ndings. First, when policy is conducted through an aggressive simple
policy rule the variability of the nominal interest rate rises, thus the likelihood of hitting the zero lower
bound rises, and the performance of the economy deteriorates. Assuming PCE-price in￿ ation in the
long run is 1.5 percent per year, which is in line with the ￿ndings of Billi (2007) regarding the optimal
2long-run rate of in￿ ation, private-sector consumption is roughly 0.06 percentage point lower under an
aggressive simple price-level targeting rule than time-zero optimal policy. Thus, the policymaker can
sustain a level of consumption for the private sector which is close to fully optimal even when policy is
conducted through a aggressive simple policy rule.
Second, table 1 shows also that the e⁄ects of the zero lower bound are less severe if policy is
conducted through a simple price-level-targeting rule, since the policymaker can shape private-sector
expectations more e⁄ectively under price-level targeting than in￿ ation targeting. In￿ ation in the long
run has a longer left tail and fatter tails￿ negative skewness and higher kurtosis￿ if policy is conducted
through an aggressive simple in￿ ation-targeting rule.4 Thus, price-level targeting provides ￿ insurance￿
against downside tail risks. The cost of such insurance is the loss in performance of the economy
bared on average to avoid tail risks. Since private-sector consumption is roughly 0.01 percentage point
lower under price-level targeting than in￿ ation targeting, the cost of insurance is not large.5 Price-level
targeting implies less variability of in￿ ation than in￿ ation targeting because the policymaker can shape
private-sector expectations about future in￿ ation more e⁄ectively by targeting directly the price level
path rather than in￿ ation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, then Section
3 explains the equilibrium de￿nition. In Section 4, the model is calibrated to recent U.S. data. Section
5 shows that moderate in￿ ation imparts substantial costs respect to low in￿ ation. Sections 6 and 7
show that price-level targeting is a more e⁄ective policy framework than in￿ ation targeting for the
management of tail risks of de￿ ation or recession. Section 8 shows the robustness of the ￿ndings to a
wide range of calibrations, and Section 9 brie￿ y concludes.
4Also the output gap in the long run has a longer and fatter left tail when policy is conducted through a simple
in￿ ation-targeting rule that prescribes an aggressive response to output deviations from an output target.
5The approximated welfare-theoretic objective function in the small New-Keynesian model is quadratic in deviations
of in￿ ation from zero and deviations of output from the socially e¢ cient level. The level of welfare is not very di⁄erent if
policy is conducted through a simple price-level-targeting rule or a simple in￿ ation-targeting rule, because the variability of
in￿ ation and the variability of the output gap are not very di⁄erent if policy implements price-level-targeting or in￿ ation-
targeting through a simple rule.
32 Model
The setting adopts the well-known sticky-price version of the small New-Keynesian model, which is
discussed in-depth by Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003a), Gal￿ (2008), and others.6
2.1 Private Sector
The private sector consists of a representative consumer and ￿rms in monopolistic competition facing
restrictions on the frequency of price adjustments ￿ la Calvo (1983). Thus, the behavior of the private
sector is described by
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xt + ut (1)
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ’(it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rn
t ) (2)
ut = ￿uut￿1 + ￿"u"ut (3)
rn
t = ￿rrn
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ r + ￿"r"rt (4)
where Et denotes the rational expectations operator conditional on all information available at time
t. ￿t is the in￿ ation rate, and xt is the output gap or the deviation of output from its ￿ exible-price
equilibrium.7 Monetary policy controls the nominal interest rate it.8
Equation (1) is a log-linear approximation to the aggregate-supply relation, which describes the
optimal price-setting behavior of ￿rms under staggered price setting. The slope parameter
￿ ￿





is a function of the structure of the model economy. ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor. ￿ > 1 is
the price elasticity of demand substitution among di⁄erentiated goods produced by ￿rms operating in
monopolistic competition. ! > 0 is the elasticity of a ￿rm￿ s real marginal cost with respect to its own
6To save space, the complete derivation of the small New-Keynesian model is not shown here.
7Output is e¢ cient at its deterministic steady state level due to an output subsidy that neutralizes the distortions from
monopolistic competition.
8By abstracting from money-demand distortions associated with positive nominal interest rates, the model can be
interpreted as the ￿ cashless limit￿of a model with money holdings.
4output level. Each period, a share ￿ 2 (0;1) of randomly picked ￿rms cannot adjust their prices and the
remaining (1 ￿ ￿) ￿rms get to choose prices optimally. The shifter of the aggregate-supply curve, ut, is
interpreted as a ￿ mark-up￿shock or the variation over time in the degree of monopolistic competition
between ￿rms.
Equation (2) is a log-linear approximation to the intertemporal Euler equation describing the repre-
sentative consumer￿ s private expenditure decisions. ’ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
or the real-rate elasticity of output. Shifting the Euler equation is the ￿ natural￿real-rate of interest
shock rn
t .9
Equations (3) and (4) describe the evolution of the exogenous mark-up shock (ut) and the real-rate
shock (rn
t ). The shocks follow AR(1) stochastic processes with autoregressive coe¢ cients ￿j 2 (￿1;1)
for j = u;r. The deterministic steady state of the real interest rate is rss ￿ 1=￿ ￿ 1, such that rss 2
(0;+1). The innovations (￿"j"jt for j = u;r) are independent both across time and cross-sectionally,
and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviations ￿"j ￿ 0 for j = u;r.
2.2 Policy
Mainly for reasons of analytical tractability, the economics literature typically studies policies which do
not rule out negative nominal interest rates.10 This paper, instead, contrasts the performance of two
policy rules within the family of implementable, simple interest-rate rules. The rules are implementable
because policy ensures the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is never violated (it ￿ 0 for all
t and each state of the economy). The rules are simple because policy responds to readily observable
macroeconomic variables rather than the shocks bu⁄eting the economy.
Simple In￿ation-Targeting Rule. Under the ￿rst policy rule, when the zero lower bound is not
binding (it > 0) the change in the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of in￿ ation from an
in￿ ation target ￿￿ and deviations of output from an output target x￿according to
it = max[0;it￿1 + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿x (xt ￿ x￿)] (6)
where ￿t ￿ pt ￿ pt￿1 and pt is the price level in period t. The output target is the steady-state value
9The real-rate shock summarizes all shocks that under ￿ exible prices generate variation in the real interest rate; it
captures the combined e⁄ects of preference shocks, productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
10See for example Woodford (2003a) or Gal￿ (2008), and references therein.
5of output consistent with the in￿ ation target, where x￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿1￿￿ solves equation (1) in steady
state, so that the change in the nominal interest rate is on average equal to zero in an equilibrium in
which the in￿ ation target is achieved on average.
Simple Price￿ Level-Targeting Rule. The second policy rule is given by
it = max
￿
0;it￿1 + ￿p (pt ￿ ￿ pt) + ￿x (xt ￿ x￿)
￿
(7)
where the change in the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of output from an output target
x￿ as before, but responds also to deviations of the price level pt from a target path for the price level
f￿ ptg, which grows deterministically at a rate ￿￿.
The simple targeting rules (6) and (7) are ￿ ￿rst-di⁄erence￿interest-rate rules since they set the
change in the nominal interest rate from its past level. In contrast, ￿ partial-adjustment￿interest-rate
rules set the current level of the nominal interest rate putting less or no weight on its past level.11
Why policymakers should employ a ￿rst-di⁄erence rule rather than a partial-adjustment rule? Under
a ￿rst-di⁄erence interest-rate rule, the policymaker does not need to know the equilibrium value of the
interest rate, since the change in the nominal interest rate is zero when price changes are at the target
rate in equilibrium. Thus, policy is less di¢ cult to implement or communicate to the public with a
￿rst-di⁄erence rule because policy requires less information about the economy.12
Woodford (2003a) explains the properties of the simple targeting rules (6) and (7) in the theoretical
case where nominal interest rates are allowed to be negative. When the policymaker uses an interest-rate
rule of the form (6), but in addition can set nominal interest rates to negative values, then equilibrium
is determinate if and only if the policy response coe¢ cients satisfy ￿￿ > ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿1￿x. When the
policymaker uses instead a rule of the form (7), but can set negative nominal interest rates, then
equilibrium is necessarily determinate if the policy response coe¢ cients satisfy ￿p > 0 and ￿x ￿ 0.
11With partial-adjustment of the nominal interest rate from its past level, the simple in￿ ation-targeting rule (6) for
instance has the more general representation it = max[0;(1 ￿ ￿i)￿ { + ￿iit￿1 + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿
￿) + ￿x (xt ￿ x
￿)], where ￿ { =
rss +￿
￿ is the equilibrium value of the nominal interest rate. However, ￿ { is irrelevant for the simple targeting rules studied
in this paper since ￿i = 1.
12In addition, numerical simulations show that the policymaker can sustain a level of private-sector consumption that
is closer to the fully optimal level, achieved under time-zero optimal policy, if the policymaker uses a ￿rst-di⁄erence rule
rather than a partial-adjustment rule. Intuitively, more dependence of current policy actions on past policy allows the
policymaker to steer private-sector expectations of future policy more e⁄ectively. Woodford￿ s (2003b) argument that
policymakers should embrace interest-rate smoothing to mimic optimal policy is even stronger when the policy interest
rate approaches the zero lower bound.
6By not taking into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the rational-expectations
equilibrium in the small New-Keynesian model is necessarily determinate regardless of how small the
policy response by the policymaker if policy responds to price deviations from target (￿￿ > 0 or ￿p > 0),
but not output deviations (￿x = 0). Intuitively, no matter how small the policy response may be, a
sustained increase in in￿ ation in excess of the target eventually results in the nominal interest rate
being permanently raised by more than the amount of the excess in￿ ation. In other words, the Taylor
principle is satis￿ed by any such rule regardless of the strength of the policy response.
Once the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is correctly taken into account, however, the
policymaker cannot respond too aggressively to price deviations from target to ensure determinacy of
equilibrium. Intuitively, monetary policy cannot stabilize the economy if nominal interest rates are
excessively variable and thereby the zero lower bound is encountered too frequently. Thus, the policy
response coe¢ cients have an upper bound, ￿ ￿j ￿ (0;+1) for j = ￿;p;x, beyond which interest-rate
policy cannot ensure determinacy of equilibrium.13
The small New-Keynesian model is developed from explicit micro-foundations. As a result, a welfare-
theoretic objective function can be derived by taking a second-order Taylor series approximation to the
expected life-time utility of the consumer. Woodford (2003a) shows that the resulting objective function
is quadratic in deviations of output from the socially e¢ cient level and deviations of in￿ ation from zero.
Thus, the policymaker could chose the response coe¢ cients of the simple policy rules to maximize
welfare for the representative consumer.
In the case of ￿ optimal￿simple policy rules, the optimal policy response coe¢ cients, ￿op
￿ or ￿op
p ,










subject to the model equations (1)-(4) and the policy rule (6) or (7), where the weight assigned to the





13A practical example of the upper bound on the policy response coe¢ cients is given in Section 5.
7is a function of the structure of the model economy.
3 Equilibrium
Equations (1), (2) and (6) or (7) form a nonlinear system of three equations with three unknowns, which
must be satis￿ed by policy in equilibrium. Solving the system delivers a three-dimensional nonlinear
equilibrium response function
y (st) ￿ (￿t;xt;it ￿ 0) ￿ R3
over a four-dimensional state space
st ￿ (ut;rn
t ;it￿1 ￿ 0; ^ pt￿1) ￿ R4
where ^ pt￿1 is the deviation of the price level from its target path in period t ￿ 1 (^ pt￿1 ￿ pt￿1 ￿ ￿ pt￿1).
When the policymaker uses the simple price-level-targeting rule (7), it needs to know the price level
in period t￿1 to conduct policy in period t. When the policymaker uses the simple in￿ ation-targeting
rule (6), however, ^ pt￿1 is not a state variable of the policy problem because the price level is irrelevant
for the equilibrium of the economy under a policy regime of in￿ ation targeting.
The state in period t + 1 depends on the state and equilibrium response in period t and the shock
innovations that are unknown in period t,
st+1 = g(st;y (st);"t+1) (10)
Associated with the equilibrium response function, the expectations function is
Etyt+1 (st) =
Z
y (g(st;y (st);"t+1))f ("jt+1)d("t+1) (11)
where f (￿) is the probability density function of the shock innovations, "t ￿ ("ut;"rt) 2 R2.14 The
14When agents have ￿ perfect foresight￿(￿"j ! 0 for j = u;r), however, the state in period t + 1 is completely described
by the state and equilibrium response in period t, st+1 = g(st;y (st)). Since agents can anticipate future variables with
certainty, the expectations function (11) is not integrated over the probability density function of the shock innovations,
Etyt+1 (st) = y (g(st;y (st))).
8Parameter De￿nition Assigned Value
Subjective discount factor ￿ = 0.9926
Real-rate elasticity of output ’ = 6.25
Share of ￿rms keeping prices ￿xed ￿ = 0.66
Price elasticity of demand ￿ = 7.66
Elasticity of ￿rms￿marginal cost ! = 0.47
Slope of the Phillips Curve ￿ = 0.024
Weight on output gap in the utility function ￿ = 0.003
Steady state real interest rate rss = 3.0% per year
s.d. real-rate shock innovation ￿"r = 0.24%
s.d. mark-up shock innovation ￿"u = 0.30%
AR(1)-coe¢ cient of real-rate shock ￿r = 0.8
AR(1)-coe¢ cient of mark-up shock ￿u = 0.1
In￿ ation Target ￿￿ = 1.0% per year
Interest-rate response to in￿ ation, or ￿￿ = 1.0
Interest-rate response to the price level ￿p = 0.4
Interest-rate response to the output gap ￿x = 0.0
Table 2: Baseline Calibration (Quarterly Model)
following de￿nition of a stochastic rational expectations equilibrium is proposed.
De￿nition 1 (SREE) Assume ￿"j ￿ 0 for j = u;r. A ￿ stochastic rational expectations equilibrium￿
of the model is a nonlinear response function y (st), over the state st with law of motion (10), such that
the nonlinear system of equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (6) or (7) is satis￿ed.
Importantly, the nonlinear system in De￿nition 1 does not have a closed-form solution. A numerical
procedure must be used to ￿nd a ￿xed-point in the space of nonlinear response functions. Since the
number of state variables is unusually high for a model with an occasionally-binding constraint on policy,
the algorithm must be highly e¢ cient. Billi (2007) explains the numerical procedure.
4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and the time period is one quarter. Table 2 summarizes
the baseline parameter values, which are expressed in quarters unless otherwise noted. The values for
the main structural parameters (’;￿;￿;!; and the resulting ￿;￿) are taken from tables 5.1 and 6.1 of
Woodford (2003a).
The parameters describing the shock processes (rss;￿"r;￿r; and ￿"u;￿u) are estimated over the
9period 1983:1￿2007:4, with the same approach of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Adam and
Billi (2006).15 The predictions of an unconstrained VAR in in￿ ation, the output gap, and the nominal
interest rate are used to construct the expectations of in￿ ation and the output gap.16 These estimated
expectations and the actual data are then plugged into equations (1) and (2). The equation residuals
identify the historical shock processes ut and rn
t . Fitting AR(1) processes to the historical shocks justi￿es
the shock processes in table 2.
The quarterly subjective discount factor is ￿ = (1 + rss)
￿ 1
4 ￿ 0.9926, as implied by the estimate for
the deterministic steady state of the real interest rate rss = 3.0 percent per year.
In line with the ￿ndings of Billi (2007) regarding the optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation, the in￿ ation
target is ￿￿ = 1.0 percent per year, which corresponds to an in￿ ation target of 1.5 percent per year for
the PCE price index after accounting for 0.5 percentage point per year in￿ ation measurement bias. The
policy response coe¢ cients are such that welfare for the representative consumer is maximized when the
policymaker responds optimally to price deviations from target (￿op
￿ = 1 or ￿op
p = 0:4), but not output
deviations (￿x = 0).
5 Why Low In￿ ation?
Figure 1 shows the representative consumer￿ s welfare using the baseline calibration in table 2 under the
di⁄erent simple policy rules. Accordingly, the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds to
price deviations from target (￿￿ > 0 or ￿p > 0), but not output deviations (￿x = 0). The representative
consumer￿ s welfare is measured in terms of its permanent consumption loss due to business cycle ￿ uctu-
ations, which is derived via a transformation of the unconditional loss in the welfare-theoretic objective
function (8).17 Appendix A.1 explains the computation of the permanent consumption loss.
[Figure 1 about here]
15Adam and Billi (2006) estimate the historical shocks over the shorter period 1983:1￿2002:4. The steady state real
interest rate is lower and the mark-up shock is more variable, and thereby the e⁄ects of the zero lower bound are more
severe, when the historical shocks are estimated over the longer period 1983:1￿2007:4.
16In￿ation is measured as the continuously compounded rate of change in the GDP Chain-type Price Index, from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The output gap is measured as the di⁄erence between Real GDP, from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, and Real Potential GDP, from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. The nominal interest rate is measured
as the average e⁄ective federal funds rate, from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
17The unconditional loss is computed as the average discounted loss across 10
4 stochastic simulations, each 10
3 periods
long after discarding several pre-simulated periods in order to ascertain that the distribution did reach its stationary
con￿guration prior to the computation of the loss.
10The left-hand panel of ￿gure 1 shows the permanent consumption loss if the policymaker uses a
simple in￿ ation-targeting (IT) rule. The permanent consumption loss depends on the strength of the
policy response to in￿ ation deviations from target. For a range of in￿ ation targets, it is optimal for the
policymaker to change the nominal interest rate one-to-one in response to deviations of in￿ ation from
target. The various lines appear rather ￿ at, but they all peak at ￿￿ = 1. At the same time, moder-
ate in￿ ation imparts substantial costs on consumers respect to low in￿ ation. The level of permanent
consumption is as much as 1.0 percentage point higher if in￿ ation is on average 1.0 percent per year
rather than 4.0 percent per year (di⁄erence between the line with circles and the line with triangles)
when in￿ ation measurement bias is not considered.
Although moderate in￿ ation is costly, in￿ ation can be too low. When the policymaker aims for
low in￿ ation, a policy response that is stronger than optimal is more likely to be excessive for the
determination of equilibrium. Excessive easing of policy causes too frequent encounters of the policy
interest rate with the zero lower bound thus monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy. If the
policymaker aims at zero in￿ ation correctly measured (line with crosses in the top-left panel of ￿gure
1), then ￿ ￿￿ = 1:5 is the strongest policy response for which the numerical algorithm can identify an
equilibrium.
As a point of comparison, the fully optimal equilibrium is attainable in theory if the policymaker
implements time-zero optimal policy. The bottom-left panel of ￿gure 1 compares welfare under a simple
IT rule (solid line with circles) and the time-zero optimal policy (dotted line with triangles).18 When the
in￿ ation target is 1.0 percent per year, if in￿ ation measurement bias is not considered, a simple IT rule
prescribing a one-to-one change in the nominal interest rate attains a level of permanent consumption
roughly 0:04 percentage point less than time-zero optimal policy. Thus, an optimal simple IT rule
attains a level of welfare for the representative consumer that is close to fully optimal.
The right-hand panel of ￿gure 1 shows the permanent consumption loss if the policymaker follows a
simple price-level-targeting (PLT) rule. The permanent consumption loss is a function of the intensity
of the policy response to price-level deviations from the target path. For a range of in￿ ation targets, it
is optimal for the policymaker to change the nominal interest rate 0.4-to-1 in response to deviations of
18Billi (2007) explains the solution of the time-zero optimal policy problem. The policymaker selects the equilibrium
paths of in￿ ation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate f￿t;xt;itg
1










and achieve the in￿ ation target ￿
￿. Welfare is evaluated based on objective (8).
11the price level from the target path. The various lines appear rather ￿ at, but they all peak at ￿p = 0:4.
At the same time, moderate in￿ ation entails substantial costs on consumers when compared to low
in￿ ation, similarly to the case of the policymaker using a simple IT rule.
In contrast to the case of the simple IT rule, however, a simple PLT rule with a stronger-than-
optimal response ensures determination of equilibrium over the range of policy responses considered,
even when the policymaker aims at zero in￿ ation correctly measured (line with crosses in the top-right
panel of ￿gure 1). Intuitively, price-level targeting stabilizes the economy even when the policymaker
is too aggressive because price-level targeting is more e⁄ective at shaping private-sector expectations
than in￿ ation targeting, and thereby the zero lower bound is not encountered as frequently.
The bottom-right panel of ￿gure 1 shows the welfare comparison between the simple PLT rule (solid
line with circles) and the time-zero optimal policy (dotted line with triangles). When the policymaker
aims at a rate of in￿ ation of 1.0 percent per year, if in￿ ation measurement bias is not taken into
account, the simple PLT rule that prescribes a 0.4-to-1 change in the nominal interest rate attains a
level of permanent consumption about 0:05 percentage point less than time-zero optimal policy. Thus,
the optimal simple PLT rule attains a level of welfare for the representative consumer that is not as
high as the optimal simple IT rule, but still close to fully optimal.
6 Price-Level Targeting Mitigates the Tail Risk of De￿ ation
Figure 2 shows the standard deviations of in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate, and the frequency
of zero nominal interest rates, when the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds to price
deviations from target (￿￿ > 0 or ￿p > 0), but not output deviations (￿x = 0). In the left-hand panel
the policymaker uses the simple IT rule, while in the right-hand panel the policymaker uses the simple
PLT rule. Independent of which simple policy rule the policymaker uses, a more aggressive response to
price deviations from target gives rise to lower variability of in￿ ation (top panel). At the same time,
the better performance of the economy on the in￿ ation front is attained through higher variability of
the nominal interest rate (middle panel). As a result, the likelihood of the nominal interest rate hitting
the zero lower bound rises if the policymaker is more aggressive ￿ghting prices deviations from target
(bottom panel).
12[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows also that the variability of in￿ ation (top panel) is not very di⁄erent if the policymaker
uses the simple PLT rule or the simple IT rule. At the same time, the nominal interest rate is less
variable (middle panel) and the zero lower bound is encountered less frequently (bottom panel) if the
policymaker uses the simple PLT rule rather than the simple IT rule. Intuitively, price-level targeting
protects the economy against hitting the zero lower bound more frequently because the policymaker
is more e⁄ective at shaping private-sector expectations about future in￿ ation by targeting directly the
price-level path rather than in￿ ation.
Figure 3 shows the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation. The distribution is presented in
terms of probability density.19 In the various panels, the dashed-vertical lines indicate the unconditional
mean. In the top panel the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds optimally to price
deviations from target (￿￿ = 1 or ￿p = 0:4), but does not respond to output deviations (￿x = 0). The
variability of in￿ ation is not very di⁄erent if the policymaker uses the optimal simple PLT rule or the
optimal simple IT rule. When the policymaker uses an optimal simple rule, the long-run stationary
distribution of in￿ ation is symmetric and normally distributed around the unconditional mean because
the nominal interest rate does not hit the zero lower bound too frequently.20
[Figure 3 about here]
The bottom panel of ￿gure 3 shows the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation when the policy-
maker uses a simple policy rule with a response to price deviations that is more aggressive than optimal
(￿￿ = 2:5 or ￿p = 1). Compared to an optimal simple rule, the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ a-
tion has a longer left tail (skewness is ￿0:3) and fatter tails (kurtosis is 3:8) than a normal distribution
if the policymaker reacts too aggressively to in￿ ation based on a simple IT rule.21 The variability of
19The distribution is computed by assembling 10
5 stochastic simulations at a speci￿c time period. The simulations are
initialized to the deterministic steady state of the model. By tracking the time-evolution of the mean, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis, it is ascertained that the distribution did reach its long-run stationary con￿guration.
20The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is the only nonlinearity in the model. In a linearized model the
endogenous variables inherit the properties of the exogenous shock processes. The mark-up shock and real-rate shock are
normally distributed. Thus, also the in￿ ation rate and the output gap are normally distributed if the nominal interest rate
does not hit the zero lower bound too frequently.
21The coe¢ cient of skewness of a normal distribution is 0, while negative (positive) skewness indicates a longer left
(right) tail. The kurtosis of a normal distribution is 3, while higher (lower) kurtosis indicates a sharper peak and fatter
tails (smaller peak and thinner tails).
13in￿ ation is not very di⁄erent if the policymaker uses the aggressive simple PLT rule or the aggressive
simple IT rule. At the same time, the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation remains symmetric
and normally distributed when the policymaker uses an aggressive simple PLT rule. Thus, price-level
targeting protects the economy against the tail risk of de￿ ation respect to in￿ ation targeting.
7 Price-Level Targeting Mitigates the Tail Risk of Recession
Figure 4 shows the implications of the policymaker responding to output deviations from target (￿x > 0),
in addition to responding optimally to price deviations from target (￿￿ = 1 or ￿p = 0:4). The top panel
compares welfare under the di⁄erent simple policy rules (solid lines with circles) and the time-zero
optimal policy (dotted line with triangles). When the policymaker uses a simple IT rule (left panel) or
a simple PLT rule (right panel), a small positive response to output deviations from target is bene￿cial
on welfare grounds. It is optimal for the policymaker to change the nominal interest rate 0.2-to-1 in
response to output deviations from target (￿x = 0:2).22 However, the welfare gain of responding to
output deviations is marginal if the policymaker already responds optimally to price deviations from
target.23
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows also that the variability of the output gap (middle panel) is not very di⁄erent if
the policymaker uses the simple PLT rule or the simple IT rule. However, responding strongly to
output deviations from target reduces signi￿cantly the variability of the output gap. At the same time,
the improvement in terms of greater stability of the output of the economy is traded o⁄ with higher
variability of the nominal interest rate. Thus, responding strongly to output deviations from target
ultimately makes policy less ￿ exible and leads to a higher likelihood of the nominal interest rate hitting
22As can be seen in the top panel of ￿gure 4, numerical simulations show that the policymaker can sustain a level of
permanent consumption that is closer to the fully optimal level if the policymaker uses a simple PLT rule including a
small positive response to output deviations from target rather than a simple IT rule. Intuitively, some dependence of
current policy actions on the past state of the economy allows the policymaker to steer private-sector expectations even
more e⁄ectively under price-level targeting than in￿ ation targeting.
23Also Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) show that a very small positive response to output ￿ uctuations is optimal if the
policymaker uses a simple policy rule that embraces interest-rate smoothing. In addition, they show that responding to
output ￿ uctuations leads to a signi￿cant welfare loss if the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that does not embrace
interest-rate smoothing. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe￿ s (2007) argument that policymakers should not respond to output
￿ uctuations is even stronger when the policy interest rate approaches the zero lower bound.
14the zero lower bound (bottom panel).
[Figure 5 about here]
The top panel of ￿gure 5 shows that the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap is
symmetric and normally distributed if the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds optimally
to price deviations from target (￿￿ = 1 or ￿p = 0:4) and has a muted response to output deviations
from target (￿x = 0:2). The bottom panel shows the long-run stationary distribution of the output
gap if the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that instead has a stronger-than-optimal responses to
output deviations from target (￿x = 0:6). The variability of the output gap is not very di⁄erent if
the policymaker uses a simple PLT rule or a simple IT rule. When the policymaker uses a simple IT
rule, the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap has a longer left tail (skewness is ￿0:5) and
fatter tails (kurtosis is 6:9) than a normal distribution. When the policymaker uses a simple PLT rule,
however, the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap is closer to normal (skewness is ￿0:4
and kurtosis is 6:2). Thus, price-level targeting protects the economy against the tail risk of recession
respect to in￿ ation targeting.
8 Robustness of Price-Level Targeting
Table 3 compares the ￿ndings for the baseline level of uncertainty to alternative scenarios of greater
uncertainty about the future state of the economy. When the policymaker sets the policy interest rate
using an aggressive simple IT rule, the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation has skewness ￿0:3
for the baseline, ￿0:4 if the mark-up shock is 20 percent more variable than the baseline, and ￿0:9 if
instead the real-rate shock is 20 percent more variable than the baseline. The skewness rises to as much
as ￿1:2 for the scenario of both type of shocks 20 percent more variable than the baseline. At the same
time, the kurtosis rises to 3:8 when both type of shocks are 20 percent more variable than the baseline.
Thus, the more variable the shocks bu⁄eting the economy the longer the left tail (negative skewness)
and the fatter the tails (higher kurtosis) of the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation, since the
risk of the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound is greater.
Table 3 shows also that, if the policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an aggressive simple
PLT rule rather than an aggressive simple IT rule, the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation does
15Calibration Aggressive Simple IT Rule￿ Aggressive Simple PLT Rule￿￿
Loss% Skew.(￿) Kurt.(￿) Loss% Skew.(￿) Kurt.(￿)
Baseline ￿0:18 ￿0:3 3:8 ￿0:19 0:0 3:0
More variable mark-up shock (1:2 ￿ ￿"u) ￿0:22 ￿0:4 4:2 ￿0:23 0:0 3:0
More variable real-rate shock (1:2 ￿ ￿"r) ￿0:18 ￿0:9 7:0 ￿0:19 0:0 3:0
Both shocks more variable (1:2 ￿ ￿") ￿0:23 ￿1:2 8:2 ￿0:24 0:0 3:0
￿￿￿ = 2:5 ￿￿￿p = 1:0
Table 3: Robustness of Simple Price-Level-Targeting Rule to More Variable Shocks
not have a longer left tail (there is no skewness) and the tails are not fatter (kurtosis is not higher) than
a normal distribution, even when both type of shocks are 20 percent more variable than the baseline.
Thus, a simple PLT rule protects the economy against the tail risk of de￿ ation respect to a simple IT
rule, even more so when there is greater uncertainty about the future state of the economy and thereby
the risk of the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound is greater. Moreover, the variability of
in￿ ation and the variability of the output gap are not very di⁄erent if the policymaker uses an aggressive
simple IT rule or an aggressive simple PLT rule. As a result, the cost of protection against tail risks
(di⁄erence in loss between the two policy regimes) is not large, since it is roughly 0:01 percentage point
of permanent consumption.
Table 4 shows the results for a wide range of changes to each structural parameter of the model.
The alternative calibrations include low or high real-rate elasticity of output (’ = 1 or 10), more or less
￿ exible prices (￿ = 0:56 or 0:76), as well as low or high competition among ￿rms (￿ = 3 or 15). In all
the alternative calibrations investigated, the long-run stationary distribution of in￿ ation has a longer
left tail (more negative skewness) and fatter tails (higher kurtosis) than a normal distribution when the
policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an aggressive simple IT rule.
Table 4 shows also that for the alternative calibrations the long-run stationary distribution of in-
￿ ation does not have a longer left tail (there is no skewness) and the tails are not fatter (kurtosis is
not higher) than a normal distribution when the policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an
aggressive simple PLT rule rather than an aggressive simple IT rule. The variability of in￿ ation and
the variability of the output gap are not very di⁄erent if the policymaker uses an aggressive simple IT
rule or an aggressive simple PLT rule. As a result, the cost of protection against tail risks (di⁄erence
in loss between the two policy regimes) is not large. Among the alternative calibrations investigated,
the cost of protection against tail risks is largest when prices are less ￿ exible than the baseline, but still
16Calibration Aggressive Simple IT Rule￿ Aggressive Simple PLT Rule￿￿
Loss% Skew.(￿) Kurt.(￿) Loss% Skew.(￿) Kurt.(￿)
Baseline ￿0:18 ￿0:3 3:8 ￿0:19 0:0 3:0
Low real-rate elasticity of output (’ = 1) ￿0:11 ￿0:8 8:3 ￿0:12 0:0 3:0
High real-rate elasticity of output (’ = 10) ￿0:21 ￿0:2 3:5 ￿0:22 0:0 3:0
More ￿ exible prices (￿ = 0:56) ￿0:08 ￿0:7 7:3 ￿0:08 0:0 3:0
Less ￿ exible prices (￿ = 0:76) ￿0:45 ￿0:2 3:4 ￿0:52 0:0 3:0
Low competition (￿ = 3) ￿0:06 ￿0:2 3:4 ￿0:06 0:0 3:0
High competition (￿ = 15) ￿0:49 ￿0:4 4:3 ￿0:53 0:0 3:0
￿￿￿ = 2:5 ￿￿￿p = 1:0
Table 4: Robustness of Simple Price-Level-Targeting Rule to Extreme Calibrations
less than 0:07 percentage point of permanent consumption.
9 Conclusions
The economics literature suggests that price-level targeting is a potential solution to downside risks in
a low-in￿ ation economy due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, such as de￿ ation or
recession. Since the private sector anticipates that a central bank with a price-level target will undo
any price changes, a central bank is more e⁄ective at shaping private-sector expectations if it targets
the price level path rather than in￿ ation.
This paper shows that price-level targeting is a solution to downside tail risks, such as sustained
de￿ ation or recession, when policy is conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero
lower bound. At the same time, the average performance of the economy is not very di⁄erent if policy
implements price-level targeting instead of in￿ ation targeting. Price-level targeting may imply less
variability of in￿ ation than in￿ ation targeting, since policymakers can shape private-sector expectations
about future in￿ ation more e⁄ectively by targeting directly the price level path rather than in￿ ation.
A few caveats must be kept in mind in interpreting the ￿ndings. The model focuses on the e⁄ects of
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and ignores other reasons for which policymakers show
concern about downside risks to the economy. These other reasons include downward wage rigidity,
as argued by Tobin (1972), and debt-de￿ ation, as argued by Fisher (1933). Thus, price-level targeting
may o⁄er even greater protection against downside tail risks in a low-in￿ ation economy than is shown
in this paper.
17A Appendix
A.1 Permanent Consumption Loss
The expected life-time utility of the representative consumer, as shown in Chapter 6 of Woodford
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is the welfare-theoretic objective function (8) which the policymaker maximizes.
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Optimal Simple Response = 1.0













































Figure 1: Moderate In￿ ation Is Very Costly Compared to Low In￿ ation
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Figure 2: Price-Level Targeting Protects Against Hitting the Zero Lower Bound












































































Figure 3: Price-Level Targeting Protects Against the Tail Risk of De￿ ation
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Figure 4: Responding to Output Improves Welfare Little and Makes Policy Less Flexible












































































Figure 5: Price-Level Targeting Protects Against the Tail Risk of Recession
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